

## Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 005399  
ORIGIN EUR-12

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HOLD FOR OPENING OF BUSINESS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MPOL, NATO

SUBJECT: NATO CRISIS MANAGEMENT: PRELIMINARY COMMENTS  
-- ON DRAFT SCENARIO FOR EXERCISE HILEX-8

REF: USNATO 7065

INITIAL REACTIONS TO THE DRAFT SCENARIO THROUGH DAY  
E -MINUS- 8 FOLLOW FOR WORKING GROUP MEETING OF JANUARY 11:

1. GENERAL COMMENTS: THE SHORT-TERM REASONS FOR SOVIET  
ACTIONS AT THE TIME OF THE GAME NEED MORE DEVELOPMENT,  
ESPECIALLY AS TO WHY THE USSR WOULD MOVE AGAINST THE WEST  
WHILE EASTERN EUROPE WAS RESTLESS RATHER THAN DEALING WITH  
THE PERCEIVED THREATS IN SEQUENCE. THE RHYTHM OF RUSSIAN  
FORCE DEPLOYMENT SHOULD ALSO BE REVIEWED TO MAKE IT FIT  
A SERIES OF ATTEMPTS BY A SOPHISTICATED SOVIET LEADERSHIP  
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 005399

TO SEND POLITICAL SIGNALS TO BOTH THE EE'S AND THE WEST.  
THE AIR OF CRISIS ON SEVERAL CONTINENTS NEEDS TO BE INTER-  
RELATED BY MORE THAN TIME - POLITICAL OR MILITARY GOALS  
SHOULD BE EVIDENT IN THE INCIDENT LIST.

2. THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS ARE KEYED TO PARAGRAPH  
NUMBERS OF THE DRAFT SCENARIO:

(3): WHILE EXERCISES SHOULD STRETCH THE IMAGINATION BY  
PLAYING HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS, THEY SHOULD ALSO BE

CLOSE ENOUGH TO STRAIGHT-LINE PROJECTIONS OF CURRENT  
WORLD POLITICS SO AS TO MAKE US PLAY THE KIND OF SITUATIONS  
WE MAY HAVE TO FACE AS AN ALLIANCE.

(4): REFERENCE TO MOSCOW'S "TIGHT" CONTROL  
OVER THE COMMUNIST REGIMES OF EASTERN EUROPE DISTORTS THE  
NEAR-TERM SITUATION FOR TWO REASONS: (1) SOME OF THESE  
COUNTRIES DO POSSESS A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE OF AUTONOMY  
(I.E., EXTERNAL AFFAIRS), AND (2) THERE IS A CONSIDERABLE  
DEGREE OF VARIANCE AMONG THE WARSAW PACT STATES INsofar  
AS SOVIET CONTROL IS CONCERNED (I.E., MOSCOW'S CONTROL  
OVER THE GDR IS MORE EXTENSIVE THAN IT IS OVER POLAND.)  
SUGGEST WORD "TIGHT" BE DROPPED.

(9): CHANGE "FREEING ITSELF OF" TO "REDUCING"; AND  
"CONCRETER" TO "MORE CONCRETE".

(11): ALTHOUGH IT IS POSSIBLE FOR EVENTS IN AN AREA LIKE  
AFRICA TO DIRECTLY AFFECT THE EAST-WEST EQUATION IN EUROPE,  
THE SCENARIO DEPICTED HERE DOES NOT SHOW A CONVINCING  
CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP. INSTEAD, IT APPEARS TO BE AN  
AFTER-THOUGHT ARTIFICIALLY GRAFTED TO A TOTALLY DIFFERENT  
SITUATION. SUGGEST THE AFRICAN SITUATION BE DROPPED FROM  
THE SCENARIO OR THAT A RATIONALE FOR RISK-TAKING AT  
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 005399

THE END OF A DISTANT, PERHAPS OVEREXTENDED SUPPLY LINE  
BE DEVELOPED.

(12): THE MOVEMENT OF SOVIET TROOPS INTO POLAND UNDER  
THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY. IT WOULD PROBABLY  
SERVE TO ANTAGONIZE THE POLISH POPULATION AND RISK  
A SERIOUS DESTABILIZATION FOR THE AREA. SUGGEST THE  
REFERENCE TO POLAND EITHER BE DROPPED OR IT BE MADE CLEAR  
THAT SOVIET TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT WOULD PASS THROUGH POLAND  
-- NOT REMAIN THERE AS PART OF A SOVIET STRIKE FORCE.

AGAIN WE QUESTION THE RELEVANCE OF NAVAL EXERCISES OFF THE  
COAST OF AFRICA. THIS IS MIXING APPLES AND ORANGES,  
AGAIN FAR FROM THE PRINCIPAL LOCUS OF SOVIET POWER.  
WHILE SOVIET STRATEGIC LIFT AND MOBILITY HAVE IMPROVED,  
AFRICA WOULD BE A RISKY FIRST TEST.

(13-A): OIL PLAY SHOULD REFLECT CONTINUED HIGH PRICESBUT

A TOTAL 1977  
PERCENTAGE INCREASE WOULD BE MORE CLEAR.

(13-B): WE FAIL TO UNDERSTAND HOW "THE EFFORTS OF THE  
SOVIET UNION TO CUT DOWN CRUDE OIL DELIVERIES TO ITS  
WARSAW PACT PARTNERS WHILE TRYING TO INCREASE ITS SALES  
TO WESTERN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES AT HIGHER PRICES"

WILL AGGRAVATE PROBLEMS FOR ALLIED COUNTRIES. THIS SHOULD MAKE MORE OIL AVAILABLE TO THE ALLIES AND SINCE THE SOVIETS TEND TO SELL OIL AT MARKET PRICES, IT WILL PROBABLY NOT BE ANY MORE EXPENSIVE THAN OIL FROM OTHER SOURCES. AT THE SAME TIME, IF THE EE COUNTRIES ARE UNABLE TO FIND OIL ELSEWHERE, THIS IS LIKELY TO DESTABILIZE THE SITUATION THERE--A PLUS FOR THE WEST. SUGGEST THIS REFERENCE BE DROPPED.

WHETHER OR NOT EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ARE ABLE TO  
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 005399

FIND ALTERNATE SOURCES OF CRUDE OIL--A HIGHLY UNLIKELY POSSIBILITY ACCORDING TO CURRENT PROJECTION--IT IS HARD TO SEE THE EFFECT ON THE WESTERN ALLIES. AT MOST IT WOULD OFFSET SOME OF THE DESTABILIZING EFFECT ON THESE REGIMES PRODUCED BY SOVIET CUTBACK IN OIL DELIVERIES.

(13-C): SEE COMMENTS ON PARA 7 ABOVE.

(13-D): THIS EVENT/MOVE IS UNREALISTIC. GERMAN MINORITIES ARE NOT A PRESSURE POINT IN THIS SENSE. THE ISSUE IS RATHER PERMISSION TO EMIGRATE, BY THOSE INTERESTED, AND EVEN HERE THE EASTERN COUNTRIES -- WANTING FRG CREDITS -- ARE IN THE POSITION OF DEMANDEUR. ADDITIONALLY THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE GDR WILL BE THE RECIPIENT OF WESTERN CREDITS, EXCEPT FROM THE FRG, FOR THE TIME BEING.

IT IS DIFFICULT TO CONCEIVE OF A SITUATION WHERE POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA WILL THREATEN TO TAKE "ACTION" AGAINST GERMAN MINORITIES IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES. THIS WOULD CAUSE SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR THEM WITH THE EAST GERMANS, WHO TEND TO BE PATERNALISTIC THEMSELVES TOWARD GERMANS IN THESE COUNTRIES. FURTHERMORE, IT IS UNLIKELY TO HAVE ANY EFFECT ON THE FRG; IT WOULD SERIOUSLY DAMAGE THE INTERNATIONAL REPUTATIONS OF BOTH COUNTRIES; THERE ARE FEW UNASSIMILATED GERMANS LEFT IN POLAND, WITH THE DEPARTURE OF 150,000 ETHNIC GERMANS; AND, MOST IMPORTANTLY, IT WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE THE WEST GERMANS TO CUT OFF OR SERIOUSLY DECREASE TRADE TO THESE COUNTRIES--A VERY SERIOUS SITUATION FOR THEM.

(13-E): IT IS SOMEWHAT SIMPLISTIC TO ASSUME THAT MOSCOW WILL ONLY MOVE AGAINST THE "DISSIDENTS" AFTER A HARDLINER TAKES OFFICE. THE SOVIETS ARE CONSTANTLY TRYING TO INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE OVER THESE COUNTRIES. ONE MUST DECIDE EXACTLY WHAT TYPES OF ACTION ARE CONTEMPLATED AND  
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 005399

THEN SPECIFY THEM, I.E., "ACCOMPANIED BY PARTICULARLY

STRONG ECONOMIC AND MILITARY MEASURES SUCH AS ECONOMIC  
SANCTIONS AND MILITARY MANEUVERS NEAR THEIR BORDERS."

GENERAL SECRETARY SHOULD BE SUBSTITUTED FOR PREMIER.

(15): THESE OIL PRODUCERS ARE AMONG THE MOST "HARD LINE"  
STATES.

(16): WE FAIL TO UNDERSTAND THE RELEVANCE OF THE PROPAGANDA  
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE WEST OVER AFRICA. THE VAST  
MAJORITY OF THE SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN POPULACE IS  
INDIFFERENT TO AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTS. OMIT.

(18): THE TITLE "GENERALISSIMO" WAS ONLY USED BY STALIN.  
HENCE WE THINK IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT IT WILL BE UTILIZED  
AGAIN--CERTAINLY NOT BY THE END OF 1977. IN ANY CASE,  
WERE THE GENERAL SECRETARY TO BE REMOVED IT IS NOT UNLIKELY  
THAT HIS SUCCESSOR WOULD TAKE THE SAME TITLE.

(19): SEE COMMENTS ON PARA 11 ABOVE.

(22): NORWAY HAS ALREADY PROCLAIMED AN ECONOMIC FISHING  
ZONE AND THE SOVIET REACTION HAS BEEN THE OPPOSITE OF  
THAT DESCRIBED. SUGGEST ANOTHER EXAMPLE.

(23): A REQUEST FOR DM 10 BILLION IN CREDITS FROM THE  
FRG IS RIDICULOUSLY HIGH, EVEN IF INTENDED BY THE POLES  
AND CZECHS TO BE REJECTED OUT OF HAND. ALSO THIS IS  
CONTRADICTORY TO PARA 13 (B).

(24): WHILE IT IS ALWAYS POSSIBLE FOR A SOVIET SHIP TO  
STOP A WEST GERMAN TANKER OFF CONAKRY, ITS RELEVANCE TO  
THIS SCENARIO IS OPEN TO SERIOUS QUESTION. IF MOSCOW  
WANTED TO CREATE AN INCIDENT AT SEA, THERE ARE MANY OTHER  
AND MORE INTELLIGENT OPTIONS AVAILABLE, SUCH AS ACTIONS  
IN THE BALTIC. WE SHOULD REIGN IN THE OUT-OF-AREA INCIDENTS  
WHEN THEY DO NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE GAME. THERE  
SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 005399

IS ENOUGH "CHAFF" IN HILEX'S TO KEEP EVERYONE READING ALL  
NIGHT FOR THE WEEK.

(25): APPLICATION OF "SANCTIONS" TO "CITIZENS OF GERMAN  
ORIGIN" IS UNREALISTIC. NOT ONLY ARE MANY/MOST OF THESE  
PERSONS ASSIMILATED IN THEIR COUNTRIES OF RESIDENCE,  
BUT ARE DISPERSED AND IN ANY CASE ARE NOT DISSIDENT  
OR SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS, OR PERCEIVED AS SUCH IN EASTERN  
EUROPE. SANCTIONS WOULD BE AN UNSETTLING STEP WITHIN EE  
COUNTRIES, AND BE ESPECIALLY UNSETTLING AND OBJECTIONABLE  
TO A KEY MEMBER OF THE PACT, THE GDR. IT IS, TO REPEAT,  
UNLIKELY THAT THE EAST WOULD UNDERTAKE SUCH A DECISIVE  
AND INEXPLICABLE STEP. SEE COMMENTS ON 13 (D) ABOVE.

(27): IN CRISIS THIS WARNING MIGHT BE BETTER MADE IN

MOSCOW AS WE WON'T BE WORRYING ABOUT ON-GOING TALKS.

(29): WE SHOULD SPELL OUT WHAT SECTIONS OF THE FINAL ACT ARE REFERRED TO IN OUR NOTES.

(30): SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO PASS TROOPS THROUGH ROMANIA COULD LEAD TO SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH BUCHAREST. IN ANY CASE, WE DOUBT THAT THEY ARE CONCERNED ENOUGH ABOUT THE SOUTHERN FLANK TO RISK DESTABILIZING ROMANIA AT A TIME OF CRISIS. IF THEY ARE THAT CONCERNED, AND ENGAGED IN NAVAL MANEUVERS IN THE BLACK SEA AREA, THEY COULD TRANSPORT SUCH TROOPS BY SHIP. SUGGEST REFERENCE TO PASSAGE OF TROOPS THROUGH ROMANIA BE DROPPED.

(33): RECENT TURKISH ACTIONS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT ANKARA IS NOT ABOUT TO REFUSE SOVIET REQUESTS TO TRANSIT THE STRAITS, SO WHY SHOULD THEY CHANGE THEIR MINDS IN

LATE 1977? IF CURRENT BEHAVIOR IS DESIGNED TO STRIKE A "COY" POSTURE VIS-A-VIS THE ALLIANCE, CHANGES IN THIS BEHAVIOR WILL DEPEND DIRECTLY ON SUPPORT BY THE US AND  
SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 005399

NATO WHICH MUST BE WRITTEN IN.

(34): SIMULTANEOUS EXERCISES ON THIS SCALE SHOULD INCLUDE DETAILS, INTELLIGENCE WARNINGS, CSCE/CBM'S (OR LACK OF NOTIFICATIONS) AND PRESS (IF ANY). THE POLITICAL SIGNALS SHOULD BE EITHER CLEAR OR CLOUDED, BUT NOT UNSPECIFIED.

KISSINGER

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